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1Cambodia: Civil Society, Power and Stalled Democracy
Stephen P. Marks and RamyaNaraharisetti
‘All power belongs to the people’. (Cambodian Constitution, Article 51, 1993)
‘The space for civil society is steadily shrinking.’ (Special Representative of the Secretary-General
for Human Rights in Cambodia, 2008)
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Introduction
This chapter examines the power relations affecting the capacity and agency of four local
Cambodian human rights organizations in the context of the painful trajectory of Cambodia since the
political transition of 1992-1993. The pivotal moment in this evolution was the 1993 election of a
Constituent Assembly organized by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC),
which adopted a democratic constitution. Although the transition ended decades of extreme
deprivation, foreign intervention, genocide, and civil war, it did not resolve most of the underlying
power relations that undermine democratic governance, produce unequal development and lead to
human rights violations. In the ensuing eighteen years, a vibrant civil society and a genuine political
opposition have struggled for political space in the face of the consolidation of power in one party (the
Economist 2010: 4), which has frequently engaged in repressive practices. 
We explore the proposition that the power-holders in an autocratic regime, operating under a
democratic constitution and pressure from civil society and the international community, display
rhetorical support for human rights, yet limit the opportunities and the organizational capacities to
contest abusive practices and vested interests. To test this hypothesis we explore the organizational
2
capacity and impact of four non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in human rights in a
dynamic environment, in which some aspects of democracy are advancing while others are backsliding.
In sum, the Cambodian government adheres superficially to human rights as set out in its democratic
constitution, while civil society contends with diverse power relations in an effort to make the promise
of the constitution a reality. Our findings confirm that ‘the formation of a civil society that is playing an
increasing role in national affairs is the single most important achievement of the past 10 years.’
(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009a: 17)
A team of Cambodian researchers, under the direction of MeySovannara, was recruited by the
Cambodia Coordination Committee (CCC) in early 2009 to provide information and analysis of the
political and institutional context in which civil society organizations and movements advance human
rights and pro-poor agendas (context mapping) and specific information regarding selected institutions
or movements (organizational studies). Research for the context mapping took place between 5
February and 23 March 2009 on the basis of published and unpublished materials in various languages,
as well as personal knowledge by the researchers. The second phase of the research took place from 22
September to 12 October 2009, and involved site visits to four organizations and review of documents
in accordance with a research protocol and ten research questions provided by the project. The four
organizations, described in the sectionbelow on ‘human rights organizations selected for this study,’
were chosento reflect a range of establishment dates, thematic agendas, geographical scope and modes
of operation.(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b)
In the next section, we chronicle the historical roots of the present political landscape, the growth of
civil society, and the sources and impact of human rights discourse. In the third section, we describe the
various types of power constraints on human rights NGOs in Cambodia. The fourth section discusses
spaces of engagement and the fifth section examines the building of countervailing power against
repression.The sixth section concludes by examining whether and how the transformation of power
structures can take place.
Context of human rights and power relations in Cambodia
Historical and political background
The political economy and history of Cambodia provide essential background to understand the
constraints and challenges faced by civil society organizations in their experiences of power. Cambodia
suffers not only from a recent history of large-scale political violence but also from widespread
corruption1 and poverty.2 The potential for civil society to exercise countervailing power is hampered
1 Cambodia scores 2.1 and ranks 154 out of 178 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index 2010. Transparency
International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2010,Berlin, Germany: Transparency International, 2010, p. 3. In  2008, the
score was 1.8 and rank 166. The CPI Score ‘relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by businesspeople and
country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)’. 
2 25.8 per cent of the population currently lives below the income poverty line of $1.25/day UNDP ranks Cambodia
124 out of 169 on the Human Development Index. UNDP, Human Development Report 2010, New York: Palgrave
Macmillan Houndmills, 2010, p. 162. See also the World Bank’s Cambodia Poverty Assessment at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20204883~isCURL:Y
~menuPK:435735~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.html.
3by Cambodia’s rapid economic growth3 and consequent employment opportunities, which encourage
support for the government in power. The country is improving with respect to primary education,
child mortality, and HIV/AIDS, but is not doing as well in reducing maternal mortality and ensuring
environmental sustainability.(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009a: 18)
Like many countries in Southeast Asia, Cambodia’s political traditions derive primarily from
eastern culture, the absolute rule of God-kings, and Buddhist beliefs. Attitudes toward human rights
and law in general continue to be affected by past traditions dating from the age of the Khmer empire,
which ruled from the distant Angkor from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries (Chandler 1993; Sharan
1986; Vickery 1986). The king was distant from the people, who rarely saw him. Even in the nineteenth
century, villagers had only a vague idea of the king, generally believing him to have the power to
influence the weather, to ‘dispense true justice’ and to be ‘the only political source of hope among
peasants.’ (Chandler 1993: 107) Patronage and clientship at the village level remained an essential part
of the social structure up to the nineteenth century, as the ‘rectitude and permanence of these
relationships had been drummed into people from birth’ (Chandler 1993: 105).
The social structures of the past and the place of the individual in the Khmer cosmology were
adapted under modern ideas of government, but not entirely eliminated by the introduction of
constitutions in the mid-twentieth century. In fact, and to the surprise of the international community,
the drafters of the 1993 Constitution not only referred in the preamble to Cambodia’s ‘grand
civilization of a prosperous, powerful, and glorious nation whose prestige radiates like a diamond’ and
to ‘the prestige of Angkor civilization,’4 they also restored monarchy. As one constitutional scholar has
observed, ‘monarchy has witnessed the most glorious moments of Khmer civilization. Its millennial
embedding makes it the principal feature of the political tradition that still prevails among the peasant
masses’ (Martin1993).
Beyond these historical and cultural influences, the power structures in Cambodia are deeply
affected by nearly seventy years of French colonialism (1887-1953)and over twenty years of civil war
(1970-1991). Along with a legacy of exploitation and repression for two-thirds of a century, the French
brought the first legal system, and a formal constitution of 1947 defining the functions and powers of
national institutions, which were in place when France granted full independence to the Kingdom of
Cambodia under King Norodom Sihanouk in 1953. These systems remained until Sihanouk was
overthrown by US-supported forces of Lon Nol in 1970 and the establishment of the Khmer Republic.
The Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), which later became the Party of Democratic Kampuchea
(PDK) and popularly known as the Khmer Rouge, defeated Lon Nol’s forces in 1975 and proceeded to
devastate the country, killing some 2 million people by execution, forced labour and starvation. In 1978
the Vietnamese invaded the country, and from 1979 to 1991 the People's Republic of Kampuchea
(PRK) was run by the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP), renamed Cambodian People's
Party (CPP) in 1991. In 1982 the resistance to the PRK formed an alternative Coalition Government of
3 GDP annual growth between 1998 and 2008 was almost 10%, interrupted in 2008-09, but is expected to recover in
2010-11 to of 6.7 %. See World Bank country brief for Cambodia at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/CAMBODIAEXTN/0,,menuPK
:293865~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:293856,00.html
4 Constitution of 23 September 1993, Preamble.
4
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) consisting of firstly, the royalist party of then Prince Norodom
Sihanouk and his son Ranariddh, called the United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and
Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC); secondly, the non-Communist Khmer People’s National
Liberation Front (KPLNF); and thirdly the Khmer Rouge (PDK). The power of the PRK and the three
components of the resistance was derivative of global and regional power relations representing the
influences of the Soviet Union (through Vietnam on the PRK), China (through the PDK), the US
(through the KPLNF) and the traditional nationalist forces (through FUNCIPEC).  
The end of the Cold War severely weakened the political support each faction received from
foreign nations, and the military stalemate led them to accept a comprehensive peace agreement at the
Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) in 1991. There all four factions agreed to a peace
process centring on withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces, transitional powers of the UN (under
UNTAC) and the Supreme National Council (SNC) (consisting of all four factions under the
presidency of Prince Sihanouk), the election of a constituent assembly, leading in turn to a new
constitution and government reflecting basic elements of liberal democracy. These arrangements were
consigned in four final agreements, including an annex containing constitutional principles.5 Following
UN-run elections in 1993, the Constituent Assembly adopted a relatively democratic constitution.
However, political and ethnic violence plagued the 1993, 1998, 2002, 2003, and 2008 elections,
although all were relatively free and fair under the circumstances. During this period, the Cambodian
People's Party (CPP), headed by Hun Sen, has consolidated its grip on political power, after initially
sharing power with Prince Ranariddh of the royalist party (FUNCINPEC) from 1993 to 1997 before
forcing him to flee in a veritable coup in 1997. Since then, the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), founded by
Sam Rainsy, a former finance minister, emerged as the only significant opposition party. A former head
of an independent human rights NGO, KemSokha, founded a smaller opposition party, the Human
Rights Party (HRP) and formed a coalition with SRP called the Democratic Movement for Change. In
the 2008 election, CPP won 90 of the 123 seats in the National Assembly, to 26 seats for SRP and 3 for
HRP, with FUNCINPEC and other smaller parties winning 2 or fewer seats each. The CPP also made
gains in the 2009 provincial and district council election. The opposition is hoping to make gains in the
2013 election.
Human rights discourse and rights debate
Human rights discourse in Cambodia results from the mix of the cultural traditions and political
history alluded to above, along with the universalist influences of the UN-managed transition. These
latter influences built on the exile experience of the Cambodians who fled the Khmer Rouge or the
PRK in the 1970s and 1980s, and expanded through the implementation of the Paris Agreements and
the adoption of the Constitution in the early 1990s. The introduction of this discourse is connected with
the dynamics of power insofar as it altered the expectations of large segments of civil society and of
their international supporters. Those altered expectations suggest a shift from a fatalistic acceptance of
arbitrary exercise of power by traditional elites, to a sense that regime legitimacy may be measured in
5 Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, signed in Paris on October 23,
1991, at the final meeting of the Paris Conference on Cambodia. The comprehensive settlement comprises four documents:
the Final Act of the Paris Conference; the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict,
with five annexes (Annex 5 contains constitutional principles); the Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence,
Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia; and the Declaration on the Rehabilitation
and Reconstruction of Cambodia. Reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 174 (1992). This compilation will be referred to below in the
plural as the Paris Agreements; the singular Paris Agreement will refer to the second of the four documents. The full text of
the agreements is available at
http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/agree_comppol_10231991.pdf.
5human rights terms and that those responsible for violating human rights must be held accountable.
This complex dialectic of Cambodia’s difficult transition is characterized by the superficial
introduction of human rights and democracy through elite interactions, on the one hand, and the deeper
appropriation of these concepts by civil society, on the other, due in large part to its experience of this
troubled history. (Marks 2005)
Human rights discourse through elite interactions
Political elites representing the four factions participated in the negotiations that eventually
produced the 1991 Paris Agreements, fielded candidates in the Constituent Assembly elections of 1993,
and drafted the new constitution, which contained a number of human rights provisions (Marks 1994).
An annex to the Paris Agreements set out the required human rights elements to be included (Ratner
1993).  It was at this elite level that Cambodia became party to the major human rights treaties 6, where
attempts were made to reform the judiciary and legal system, and that the constitution was drafted, all
of which drew upon human rights discourse but were essentially gestures by elites seeking political
advantage rather than being driven by popular forces. 
An important tool used by UNTAC to introduce human rights discourse and practice was a law
called ‘The Provisions Relating to the Judiciary and Criminal Law and Procedure applicable in
Cambodia during the Transitional Period’ or ‘Transitional Provisions’ (also known as ‘UNTAC law’)
of 10 September 1992, which was designed to incorporate into domestic law the most relevant
standards of international human rights law. These provisions set out rules for an independent judiciary,
the conduct of law enforcement officials, conditions of arrest and detention, a fair trial and the
definition of crimes and misdemeanours and the penalties for these infractions. It was used until 2007
when the National Assembly adopted a new penal code7, although its provisions have been improperly
interpreted for purposes of political harassment, including of NGOs (United Nations 2010a: para. 33).
Human rights discourse introduced by civil society 
The emergence of Cambodian NGOs using explicit human rights language is a direct result of the
formal commitment in the 1991 Paris Agreement that ‘all persons in Cambodia shall enjoy the rights
and freedoms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international
human rights instruments’ and that Cambodia undertakes ‘to support the right of all Cambodia citizens
to undertake activities which would promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms’.
(Paris Agreements (1991): art. 15.)
6  The Supreme National Council, on behalf of Cambodia, adhered to these seven international human rights treaties:
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention and Protocol on the Status of Refugees. Cambodia was already a
party to The Convention on the Repression and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Other, more technical, treaties, such as the UNESCO Convention on
Illicit Traffic in Cultural Property, would belong to a more exhaustive enumeration of human rights treaties but are not
relevant for present purposes. The authority to ratify derived from Article 15 (2) (a) of the Paris Agreementby which
Cambodia undertook ‘to adhere to relevant international human rights treaties.’
7 Part of the Penal Code came into force in December 2009 and the rest entered into force in December 2010.The
Assembly has adopted over 300 laws since 1993. A compilation of laws currently in force in Cambodia published by
UNCOHCHR. See also http://www.national-assembly.org.kh/.
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According to the report of the UN Secretary-General of 1992 setting out the UN mandate during the
transition of 1992-1993, ‘The development and dissemination of a human rights education program is
foreseen as the cornerstone of UNTAC's activities in fostering respect for human rights...’ (United
Nations 1992: para. 12; Marks 1997)This mandate included introducing human rights into government
school curriculum at all levels(United Nations 1992: para. 13), within a broad expectation that
‘Cambodians must fully understand both the content and the significance of those rights and freedoms
in order to be in a position to know when and how to protect them properly.’ (United Nations 1992:
para. 12) The strategy and plan of action by UNTAC’sHuman Rights Component focused heavily on
civil society (defenders, human rights associations, women's associations, journalists, monks, and
health workers). It also set up a post-election Constitutional Literacy Programme, including a
constitutional forum, which concluded with the formation of a coalition of 14 groups called Ponleu
Khmer (Cambodian Illumination) and an NGO strategy for lobbying the Constituent Assembly in order
to press for strong human rights provisions, especially with respect to the rights of women. The strategy
was implemented with a remarkable degree of courage, initiative and perseverance and, to a certain
extent it was an inaugural event for post-UNTAC independent, civil society human rights
promotion.For example, the spokesperson for Ponleu Khmer found the draft of August 1993
contradictory in that it ‘specifies human rights fairly clearly and stipulates a separation of powers, but
… it concentrates the decision-making power of the state in the hands of a few people. ... When power
is concentrated in the hands of only a few people, how can human rights be protected?’ Ponleu Khmer
denounced the secrecy of the drafting process as a denial of participatory democracy.
(Brown1993:.7)The NGOs favoured detailed human rights provisions based on international standards,
with effective enforcement procedures, but were disappointed by the secrecy of the process and the
weak provisions in the draft constitution. Nevertheless, Ponleu Khmer continued after the proclamation
of the Constitution and the departure of UNTAC in 1993 to educate the population about participatory
democracy and to push for a sense of accountability on the part of elected officials and civil servants.
 Since the departure of UNTAC, local and international NGOs and the Cambodia Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights have organized hundreds of large-scale training projects,
including for teachers, law enforcement officials, monks, health professionals, judges and defenders.
(Leang1998)
Overview of civil society organizations
Emergence of human rights-promoting organizations
The proliferation of NGOs, independent of the state and party structures, has been the ‘first step
towards a civil society in Cambodia after its destruction between 1975 and 1978’.(Kirby 1994:para.
165) Courageous and enterprising Cambodians, aware of the mobilizing value of human rights from
their experience in exile or in border camps prior to the arrival of UNTAC, set up human rights NGOs,
which UNTAC registered quite liberally. Five human rights groups were functioning in Cambodia
during the transitional period, with combined membership claimed to be over 150,000. The CCC study
attributes the establishment of human rights NGOs in the early 1990s to ‘the presence of a large
number of overseas NGOs, when the political climate stabilized with UNTAC’s presence (1991-
1993)’(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009a: 8; Kamm: 230). 
Current array of NGOs functioning in Cambodia
According to the CCC, of the 2,000 or so NGOs registered with the Interior Ministry and operating
in Cambodia, 47 local NGOs may be considered as working in the field of human rights or on human
7rights promotion and protection.8 These NGOs cover a range of issues related to general promotion and
protection of human rights, women’s rights, housing and land rights, disabled persons’ rights,9
children’s rights,10 health or HIV/AIDS, as well as landmines, and environmental protection. 
Human rights organizations selected for this study
The four organizations reviewed here address the most pressing human rights issues facing
Cambodia and their experiences of power is analysed in the next sections. Two are general human
rights organizations with a long history and broad programmatic focus, while the other two are newer
and have a narrower focus, one on legal representation, and the other on advocacy for disability rights.
The four organizations are:
Cambodian League for Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO)
LICADHO is a membership organization engaged in monitoring and policy promotion. Since its
establishment in 1992, LICADHO has primarily focused on civil and political rights; however, its
mandate was extended, around 1995, to include economic, social and cultural rights in response to
violations of land rights, the right to adequate housing and indigenous rights. Through its headquarters
in Phnom Penh and 12 provincial offices, LICADHO pursues its mandate through seven programme
areas, namely, advocacy, education, monitoring, medical, torture, children’s rights and women’s rights.
Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC)
ADHOC, founded in 1991 by a group of former political prisoners, engages in monitoring,
education, promotion of women’s rights, and human rights advocacy. Originally, it functioned out of a
Buddhist temple in Phnom Penh, relying on volunteers until it received financial assistance from
UNTAC and foreign donors, which allowed it to develop two main programmes, namely, investigation
of human rights violations and human rights training. It has a central office in Phnom Penh and 23
provincial offices.11 The offices carry out the different programmes in communes and villages. By
establishing the link between human rights, development and poverty reduction, ADHOC takes a
structural approach to power relations and seeks to address rights deprivation by providing affected
populations with knowledge and understanding of human rights, law and democracy and of how to
defend them(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 18).
8 The 47 organizations identified as working in human rights are listed in CCC, Context Mapping Report,pp. 27-28.
CCC used the following source for the list of all NGOs: http://www.yellowpages-cambodia.com
9  Given the tremendous toll of years of armed conflict, it is not surprising that some 21 international and local
NGOs fall into this category. The CCC noted that between 650,000 and 1.4 million Cambodians live with a disability, and
the exact count may be higher. In addition to the local NGOs working on disability in Cambodia, the six international
groups are especially active in this area. See http://www.apcdproject.org/countryprofile/cambodia/.
10 These organizations deal with such issues and the cross-generational psychological impact of Khmer Rouge
atrocities and civil war, infant mortality, low literacy, limited access to education, especially beyond primary school,
violence and sexual abuse, trafficking and dangerous forms of child labour. In addition five organizations have children’s
programmes.
11 Cambodia has one capital and 23 provinces (the Sub-Decree No. 18 of the Royal Government of Cambodia, dated
12 January 2009, signed by Hun Sen). Previously, Cambodia had 3 municipalities and 21 provinces. Now Phnom Penh is
the only Capital of the Kingdom of Cambodia.
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Community Legal Education Centre (CLEC)
CLEC engages in legal education, advocacy and litigation in high profile cases. CLEC is a non-
profit, non-partisan, local human rights NGO, created in 1996 as legal resource centre, promoting the
rule of law, justice and democracy in Cambodia. From 1996 to 2001, CLEC operated as an arm of the
University of San Francisco School of Law, funded by USAID. In December 2001, CLEC became a
Cambodia registered NGO. CLEC began with programmes on election law, decentralized dispute
resolution and the justice system at the communal level. Currently CLEC has four major strategic
programs dealing with (1) land and natural resources; (2) labour rights and industrial relations; (3)
access to justice; and (4) good governance. 
Cambodian Disabled People’s Organization (CDPO)
Finally, CDPO represents disabled people and their rights in Cambodia, working in large part in
cooperation with government agencies. This NGO helps the nearly 658,000 persons with disabilities in
Cambodia, 4.7 per cent of the total population(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 29, note 24).
CDPO promotes the human rights of persons with disabilities at the national level through committees
and working groups to influence decision-making and policy development bodies, both governmental
and non-governmental.  The CCC describes CDPO as having ‘strong networks of persons with
disabilities from the village level up to the national level’ and ‘as one of Cambodia’s most courageous,
competent federations of members with disabilities [which] covers 24 provinces, reaching villages,
districts and provinces’(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 33).
Types of power
These NGOs face all three types of power, ranging from the more obvious, visible power, to those
that occur behind the scenes, namely, hidden power (i.e. barriers that preclude the entry of certain
actors and issues as a matter of public discourse and negotiation) and invisible power (i.e., conflict that
is hidden through internalisation of powerlessness or lack of awareness) (Gaventa 2005: 15).
Visible power
The sustained efforts by the organizations studied have drawn attention to visible power of the
government and the need to strike a balance between challenging power relations and maintaining a
working relationship with government entities. 
The Public Interest Litigation Project of CLEC challenges both government and business interests
connected with government officials and government interests. CLEC has challenged, in court,
evictions of the urban poor for both private and public development without fair and just compensation.
Despite criticism from the government about its methods, CLEC manages to get its cases heard and has
been successful on some but not all.(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 14. Exact figures were
not provided.)CLEC has also functioned collaboratively, such as winning a bid to provide its
contractual services in the Access to Justice for the Indigenous People Project, a joint programme of
the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior, funded by UNDP for 2007-2009. Under this
programme CLEC worked with the ministries to provide assistance to the indigenous communities in
Mondulkiri and Ratanakiri (through training workshops to grassroots organizations as well as to
government and law enforcement officials, legal aid, radio and TV programmes on land and indigenous
rights, and publications and T-shirts)(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 34).
Although LICADHO provides technical and advisory support to communities for peaceful
demonstrations and complaints challenging the government, it also cooperates is ways discussed blow
9under ‘invited spaces’.However, LICADHO’s reporting on human rights abuses is usually criticized by
the Ministry of Interior and the National Human Rights Commission for being overly critical of the
government’s actions(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 33).
These examples of strategies employed by the three organizations have proved to be successful in
challenging but not actually transforming visible power structures. Part of the explanation is that, these
strategies occur in a context which the CCC describes as ‘still worse and unreconstructed from its
authoritarian roots’, concluding, ‘Cambodia is covered by a culture of impunity, corruption, power
abuses, land grabbing, extra-judicial killing, illegal arrest and detention, political violence, persecution,
threats and intimidations.’(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009a: 23).
State power over the opposition is reflected not only in the coup of 1997 which removed co-prime-
minister Prince Ranariddh but in subsequent events, especially regarding former FUNCINPEC finance
minister Sam Rainsy. He was expelled from the party in 1994, founded an opposition party in 1995,
which he renamed the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) in 1998.  When his parliamentary immunity was lifted,
he went into exile in 2005 to avoid arrest. He was tried in absentia in 2005 and sentenced to 18
monthsand a fine for defamation but was pardoned by the king and returned in 2006. In 2009 an arrest
warrant was issued on charges of inciting racial discrimination and destroying demarcation posts, his
parliamentary immunity lifted again and he was sentenced to ten years in prison, resulting in his
decision to live abroad (BBC 2010). The Cambodian Supreme Court rejected his appeal on other
charges and confirmed his sentence to two years, making a total of 12 years he would serve if he
returned (Phnom Penh Post 2011).His party gained 9 seats in the January 2012 senate elections and in
March 2012 he appealed to the UN and the US to assist him in return in time for the June 2012
commune elections and the July 2013 National Assembly elections. (Sakada 2012)Moreover, the
deputy head of the Sam Rainsy Party, Mu Sochua, a former human rights activist and minister(Mydens
2010), was also stripped of parliamentary immunity and sentenced on defamation charges in 2009 and
threatened with two years imprisonment for failure to payShe left and courageously chose to return in
2010 and face the possibility of prison.The fine was deducted from her pay and restoration of her
parliamentary immunity was under consideration in early 2012 (Reaksmey 2012). Mu Sochuahas been
the most outspoken voice challenging the ‘visible power’ of the regime and is very prominent in civil
society activism, having run a woman’s rights organization and been instrumental in Ponleu Khmer
(discussed above under ‘human rights discourse introduced by civil society’).
A third example of visible power is the impunity for the Khmer Rouge and the failure of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC, the ‘Khmer Rouge Tribunal’) to indict
more than a handful for former PDK leaders and to convict more than one suspect, as of mid-2011
(Mydens 2010).12 ADHOC runs The Khmer Rouge Tribunal and International Criminal Court
Monitoring Programme, which publishes critical reports on developments of the Khmer Rouge
Tribunal (Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 23-24).The issue is significant from the
perspective of ‘visible power’ as the government has so far been successful in resisting pressure from
the UN and civil society to make the tribunal an effective instrument of accountability.13
12 In July 2010, the trial chamber sentenced KaingGuekEav, alias Duch, to 35 years in prison for war crime and
crimes against humanity, which the Supreme Court increased to a term of life in February 2012. See
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en for the official web site and note 13 below for additional critical monitoring.
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Hidden power
Cambodia’s authoritarian government exercises ‘hidden power’ by blocking NGO access to critical
issues. The most significant manifestations of both ‘visible power’ and ‘hidden power’affecting
relations with Cambodian human rights NGOs are government restrictions on NGO freedom of action
and access to resources, in spite of protective provisions in the Constitution. NGOs flourished under
UNTAC (1992-93) thanks to ease of registration and the presence of a large number of international
organizations, thus checking the ‘hidden power’ of what became the dominant political party. Post-
UNTAC, registration with the Ministry of the Interior has become a long and torturous procedure,
fraught with bureaucratic delays. Moreover, according to the CCC study, ‘the government has imposed
a number of restrictions on their activities, especially the activities of human rights NGOs’(Cambodia
Coordination Committee 2009a: 23). The Ministry of the Interior issued guidelines in 2005, which, in
CCC’s view, ‘restrict the activities of NGOs, especially the holding of public forums’(Cambodia
Coordination Committee 2009a: 24). The government has utilized anti-terrorism legislation to justify
restrictions on funding14 and has prepared a draft law placing even more constraints on registration and
stringent financial reporting requirements, which the Prime Minister uses from time to time to
intimidate NGOs. Drawing on information from some NGO workers, the CCC study concluded that
‘the government's attitude toward local NGOs is more one of suspicion than cooperation’(Cambodia
Coordination Committee 2009a: 9).
This assessment is reflected in the experience of the four NGOs studied here. A U N Special
Representative noted in 2008 that ‘[t]he space for civil society is steadily shrinking’ (United Nations
2008, para. 18), adding, 
‘[t]he desire of people to assemble freely is seen [by the government] as dangerous, and the
freedom of expression has to be curtailed, while threats, harassment, intimidation, attacks, and
even extrajudicial killings may be necessary to curb more determined opponents who cannot be
bribed or cajoled. Above all, people have to be taught to fear the rulers, by their caprice and
unpredictability, and especially brute force’ (United Nations 2008, para. 18).
While acknowledging that ‘Cambodia has made great strides in strengthening human rights in
recent years in an environment of political stability, economic growth and continued generous
international assistance and support’, the current Special Rapporteur, Surya Subedi, ‘observed that
there remains a lack of meaningful and regular dialogue between the Government and civil society
organizations for the promotion and protection of human rights’ (United Nations 2010, paras. 64
and17).15.Moreover, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders urged ‘the
13 The controversies surrounding the tribunal are also monitored by the Cambodia Tribunal Monitor, ‘a consortium of
academic, philanthropic and non-profit organizations committed to providing public access to the tribunal and open
discussion throughout the judicial process’ (See http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/.) and Documentation Center of
Cambodia (DC-Cam), “an independent non-partisan Cambodian research institute.” (See http://www.dccam.org/.).
14 In particular the Anti-Terrorism Law enacted in 2007 (Chapter 11 on funding and aid for terrorism). CCC quotes
Prime Minister Hun as saying in September 2008, ‘We have a concern that sometimes under so and so NGOs, financial
assistance has been provided for terrorist activities, take for instance the Al Um Quran under which Ham Bali hid himself in
Cambodia.’ (Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009a: 9).
15 It should be noted that during his visit in 2010 the Special Rapporteur met with civil society leaders representing
over 300 organizations. Prior to the appointment of Subedi as ‘Special Rapporteur’ the human rights monitoring was carried
out by a succession of ‘Special Representatives’.
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Government to make every effort to ensure a safe environment conducive to the work of all defenders
in the country’(United Nations 2010, paras. para. 254). 
Invisible power
All four NGOs use human rights as an appropriate language for their actions in part as a result of
their experience in exile or under various brutal regimes. The appeal of human rights was reinforced by
the positive impression of human rights promotion during the transitional period (1992-1993) and the
support from UN human rights bodies and other international partners after the transition. One might
suspect that the embrace of human rights discourse is donor-driven to the extent that organizations
seeking to attract foreign funding use the language of human rights to appeal to Western and United
Nations sources of funds. Yet the evidence available does not support this explanation in the case of the
four groups studied. CCC, citing the positive impact of UNTAC, simply affirms, ‘Human Rights
became the language of the entire world in the domain of politics, international relations, and
law.’(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009a: 19)The engagement of the study organizations in
women’s rights issues appears to be a result of this impact on a particularly tenacious form of invisible
power (patriarchy), rather than the result of donors’ encouragement of such programmatic work. 
Spaces of engagement
Claimed and created spaces
A ‘claimed space’ refers to space which less powerful actors claim either from or against power
holders while ‘created space’ refers to space that is created autonomously by a less powerful actor.
These spaces can been seen on a continuum from those created by social movements and community
associations to those claimed by people outside of institutionalized policy arenas (Gaventa 2005: 12). 
CLEC has ‘claimed space’ through advocacy on a number of significant law reform issues
including the 2001 Land Law, sub-decree on indigenous communal land titling, establishment of the
quasi-judicial arbitration council for collective labour disputes, the election dispute resolution process,
and the drafting of the Peaceful Assembly Law. Many of these were not areas where civil society was
invited to influence the process, especially since they involved land grabs and allegations of corruption.
Through its Public Interest Legal Advocacy Project (PILAP), CLEC used legal education,
empowerment and advocacy by selecting high profile legal cases with a strong potential for publicity.
CLEC employed community protests to protect land and natural resource rights, collective campaigns
to promote labour rights and generate community engagement to monitor implementation of laws
already in place. The CCC highlights the case of the Ratanakiri Indigenous Community, which filed a
complaint against the wife of a powerful person who illegally grabbed their ancestral land. CLEC was
able to claim this traditionally ‘closed space’ of elite land grabs for this dialogue. The CCC study states
that PILAP is the ‘most controversial’ of CLEC’s programmes because some of the cases are lodged
against the government or high profile persons strongly connected with the government(Cambodia
Coordination Committee 2009b: 14). This confrontational dimension seems to be characteristic of
‘claimed’ as opposed to ‘created spaces’.
Another example of CLEC’s promotion of ‘created space’ is that of the Labour Programme, which
has since 2002 focused on Cambodia labour law and industrial relations. The programme seeks to
ensure that all employment sectors uphold a good working environment in which labour law and rights
are adhered to and disputes are settled under due process. 
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A third example of space created by CLEC is the Access to Justice Programme (AJP), which
introduced alternative dispute resolution processes where the existing local authorities offered none.
The creation of this space was recognized by the government’s justice sector reform strategy. Once
alternative dispute resolution became an on-going government activity, CLEC discontinued the AJP.
The confrontational approach of PILAP reflects ‘claimed space’ whereas AJP was engaged in a less
controversial ‘created space’, which was successfully transferred to the government.
ADHOC’s publishing programme is instrumental in creating new spaces for engagement. Its main
publication, NeakChea [Free Man], documents human rights violations for an audience of middle-
income, moderately educated people involved in Cambodian politics. The readership ranges from NGO
staff, government officials, students and international stakeholders. ADHOC’s publications promote
dialogue around new and controversial rights concerns, effectively creating a ‘claimed and created’
space from mainstream media and news reporting, which may not have otherwise existed. While the
other organizations also publish reports, NeakChea’s regularity and reputation contribute more than
others to creating such a space. ADHOC’s media programme of FM radio broadcasting on nine radio
channels, provided 588 hours airtime in 2008(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 23), also
‘created space’ around relevant human rights concerns. 
CDPO engages with created and claimed spaces to a lesser extent since its role is less controversial
in nature, but rather seeks to work with power holders on behalf of persons with disabilities. One
exception is the ‘created space’ of the promotion of rights for women and children with disabilities,
which tends to be overlooked within Cambodian society. CDPO’s programme on ‘Representing the
Voice of Disabled People’ focuses specifically on the promotion and protection of these vulnerable
populations through public forums, training for women with disabilities, field visits to document cases
and media campaigns to raise awareness. 
Women’s rights and land issues are two spaces that the NGOs have successfully created through
media campaigns, demonstrations, lobbying and other avenues of rights promotion. By utilizing UN
documents and reports, the NGOs were able to legitimize their involvement inwomen rights and land
issues in relation to internationally recognized human rights(Cambodia Coordination Committee
2009b: 14).  
Invited spaces
‘Invited spaces’ refer to situations in which organizations and individuals are invited to participate
in negotiations by various kinds of authorities (Gaventa 2005: 12). For example, LICADHO works with
the Ministry of Interior (especially with the Prison Department) concerning the prison research project.
Its cooperation with the Ministry of Health relates to poor children and women victims of human rights
violations seeking medical treatment. Finally, it works with the Ministry of Justice and the provincial
and municipal courts16 on cases of human rights violations.(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b:
41) LICADHO only works with courts when following-up on cases brought by its clients. 
LICADHO also challenges the political status quo in ‘closed spaces’. Building on its strong ties to
UNTAC, LICADHO is often invited by the international community rather than the national
government. LICADHO’s strength in leveraging international actors is perceived as threatening to the
government, which often criticizes LICADHO for the lack of local participation in strategic planning
and agenda setting.LICADHO’s evidence-based advocacy work includes comprehensive reports and
16  Monitoring staff frequently assist victims in filing cases with the courts and follow up those cases.
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briefing papers on human rights violations, which are an important source of information for
international actors and therefore not welcomed by the government. As the CCC reports, ‘LICADHO’s
website provides rich and updated information regarding human rights violations’... [its] president and
the Executive Director play a vital role in initiating and leading advocacy work with assistance from
their expert staff’.(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 41)
CLEC’s Access to Justice for the Indigenous People Project is the principal example of an ‘invited
space’ in that the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior (with funding from UNDP) contracted
CLEC’s services from 2007 to 2009. CLEC won this bid to provide training tothe two provinces, where
indigenous communities benefited from extensive training on relevant laws, the judicial systems and
alternative dispute resolution. CLEC also trained provincial government officials (police, judges and
prosecutors) to increase their understanding oflegal rights to land and natural resources of indigenous
peoples. Furthermore CLEC initiated ‘peace tables’, where selected disputes were resolved with all
parties present (local and government officials). Lastly it provided technical assistance in the form of
legal aid and media/print campaigns on indigenous people’s rights. Thus indigenous rights area clear
example of an ‘invited space’ from the government that CLEC was able to ‘open’ (Gaventa2005: 12).
ADHOC’s limited involvement in ‘invited spaces’ includes the Women’s Rights Programme,
which encompass working with the Ministry of Women’s and Veteran’s Affairs and its leadership with
the Committee for Free and Fair Elections (COMFRELL), which monitors and investigates cases of
political violence around electoral procedures. 
Of the four NGOs examined, CDPO is the organizationthat has been able to use the ‘invited space’
inrelations with the government to the greatest benefit of its constituency (Gaventa 2005: 35). CDPO
operates under a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and
Youth Rehabilitation. Its advocacy programme seeks to mainstream and integrate rights of persons with
disabilities into the government and non-government policies and procedures. The CCC cites its
advocacy as instrumental in the ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities in October 2007 and the subsequent adoption of the Law on the Promotion and Protection
of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in July 2009. Through these forms of collaboration, CDPO is
often ‘invited’ to represent persons with disabilities and conduct public awareness campaigns through
web-based media, TV, print media, large events such as International Day for Disabled Persons, and
reporting of statistics on persons with disability. However, the CCC deplored that CDPO’s efforts have
not prevented the government from restricting certain rights of people with disabilities. It also noted
that CDPO itself has been subjected by the government to limitations on peaceful demonstrations,
freedom of expression, peaceful marching, and peaceful strikes(Cambodia Coordination Committee
2009b: 35).
Closed spaces
When bureaucrats, experts and elected representatives make decisions with little consultation or
involvement of the affected population their decision-making is described as a ‘closed space’ (Gaventa
2005: 12). In Cambodia much of the decision-making spaces are closed to outside participation, and are
occupied by government agencies. All four of the organizations seek to challenge ‘closed spaces’ by
employing human rights rhetoric and campaigning for more participation, building coalitions and
utilizing the justice system to increase involvement, transparency and accountability. 
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LICADHO confronts many closed spaces without facing the same consequences that other smaller
organizations may face due to its international support. It has one of the best monitoring offices, which
investigates human rights violations and assists victims with the legal process. Specially trained staff
also monitors 18 prisons to assess conditions and ensure that pre-trial detainees have access to legal
representation. One of the main strategies that LICADHO employs to prise open ‘closed spaces’ is data
and evidence collection and dissemination. This work is housed in its Advocacy, Documentation and
Resources Office, which compiles cases into a central electronic database for use by the general public,
government officials and NGOs. Its publications constitute one of the main sources of information on
human rights in Cambodia (Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 38-39). When LICADHO
reports on human rights abuses by the government, such as cases of unlawful detention, the Ministry of
Interior and the National Human Rights Commission typically call the reports groundless and compiled
without consultation. But the general public, the international community and other NGOs tend to find
such reports reliable and evidence-based, effectively creating a platform for public dialogue and thus
creating space. 
ADHOC implements a Human Rights Programme within the monitoring section that specifically
addresses cases that have been traditionally settled in ‘closed spaces’. For example, ADHOC staff
monitors and investigates human rights abuses committed or authorized by public and military
authorities. Alleged victims bring cases to ADHOC, which investigates and, if a case is found to have
merit, refers the case to the court or the government agencies involved. Certified copies are then
forwarded to the Human Rights Commission of the Senate, the National Assembly and OHCHR.
Serious cases are sent to the Action Committee – an umbrella organization of 23 human rights NGOs –
for collective action such as public denunciation through the media, press releases, press conferences,
or representations to the appropriate ministry. The programme also monitors the prisons in Phnom
Penh and various provinces on a monthly basis(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 20). 
Another example of a ‘closed space’, which ADHOC seeks to prise open, is the issue women’s
rights and violence against women, already discussed in the context of ‘claimed spaces’. It can also be
considered a ‘closed space’ in Cambodia because legally domestic violence is not a crime.
Furthermore, although rape is a criminal offence, procedures to prosecute perpetrators are
inadequate(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 20-21). The CCC report indicates that the
perpetrators often bribe court officials to drop the criminal case against them. As a result of this ‘power
over’ the victim, the court informs the victim and her family that a civil case with minimal financial
compensation should be accepted, without consultation about whether a criminal or civil case is
preferred by the victim. Further, the substantial court fees required to pursue a criminal investigation
prevent action from even those families aware of their options. Thus after the financial compensation is
accepted, the space becomes closed since no criminal prosecution is possible. Although women who
come to ADHOC are assisted in finding medical care and a safe place to live, and in filing for divorce,
the opening of this space is a slow process. Tempering the ‘closed’ nature of this space is the fact that
ADHOC’s Women's Rights Programme coordinates with other concerned organizations, such as the
Ministry for Women's and Veteran's Affairs, the Cambodian Women's Crisis Center, and the National
Assembly's Human Rights Commission, to overcome the traditional attitudes toward women. 
Protecting the rights of women and children involved in trafficking is also a ‘closed space’ that
ADHOC seeks to make more ‘open’. Although prostitution is not illegal in Cambodia, it is illegal to
buy and sell people for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Nonetheless, due to the strong ties between
police officials and brothel owners and the lack of awareness about laws pertaining to the trafficking
and exploitation of minors the space for advocacy is generally closed(Cambodia Coordination
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Committee 2009b: 21). When it is possible to gain access to women in brothels, ADHOC provides
shelter, employment, medical care and support(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 21). As a
result of ADHOC training activities, some women are able to speak more openly about taboo topics of
sexual and gender based violence and the trafficking of young girls, thus opening the space for
dialogue about prevention(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 21). 
CLEC is heavily involved with ‘closed spaces’ of land dispute resolution and forced eviction. For
example, it provided legal representation to the KohPich community of 90 families, victims of
government forced evictions (without fair and just compensation) between 2004 and 2006(Cambodia
Coordination Committee 2009b: 14-15). Before CLEC was involved the space was ‘closed’ for
negotiation and the community was forced to accept the conditions of its eviction without legal due
process. With CLEC intervention (along with the support of partner NGOs and communities) the
compensation increased over time through structured negotiations with the Municipality of Phnom
Penh. CLEC (and partner organizations) were relatively effective in increasing the accountability and
transparency of government evictions. CLEC was also involved with six other cases with coalitions
against powerful business people encroaching on indigenous land through government
concessions(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 14). 
Forms of Power (‘over’, ‘to’ ‘with’ and ‘within’)
‘Power over’ describes the form of power used by the powerful to control the powerless and was
discussed above in the context of visible, hidden and invisible power. This section examines ‘power
to’, ‘power with’ and ‘power within’. (Gaventa, p. 9.) Such forms of power build countervailing power
as means to counter dominant power and to seek changes to power structures that deny human rights to
poor and marginalized populations. 
‘Power to’
‘Powerto’ is the capacity to act as well as the presence of agency. This capacity to act is seen in all
four organizations, but ‘power to’ can also be seen a temporally dynamic process. Most of the
organizations started with little ‘power to’ but were able to identify key strategies and tactics to place
themselves in positions to enhance and use their power when necessary. A major tool for increasing
‘power to’ is the use of the media to give voice to the experiences of the powerless. Further, the NGOs
use of human rights language amplifies ‘power to’ and, therefore, they engage in human rights
education to communicate this language to local populations. Building agency at the local level has
proved to be the most sustainable approach to increasing ‘power to’. 
An example of CLEC’s ‘power to’ is its role in peaceful negotiations among communities, private
companies and government officials for more just solutions to disputes, including convincing the
government to delay forced evictions, and, where evictions could not be avoided, ensuring that
communities had adequate time to relocate. Regarding collective bargaining agreements, CLEC
ensures in many cases that the legal and judicial processes of the Constitution with regard to workers’
rights are respected. 
An example of ADHOC’s ‘power to’ is the impact of its the People Empowerment Programme
(PEP), which was behind 153 non-violent demonstrations in 2008 relating to 156 cases of serious
human rights violations by government bodies or persons with government connections, resulting in 89
cases being solved(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 28). ADHOC also employs ‘power to’
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approaches to monitor and investigate cases of land rights abuses, which are referred to the appropriate
government affiliated authorities. The CCC found that ADHOC was ‘influential both in government
circles and in the provinces.’(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 28)
CDPO has also been able to exercise ‘power to’ but its focus has been more on influencing
legislation and ratification of international treaties, specifically the UN Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disability, mentioned above under ‘invited spaces.’ Although the enforcement of these
laws requires close monitoring by CDPO, the organization’s role in itsadoption is an example of
‘power to’ at the policy level. 
LICADHO’s strength in exercising ‘power to’ is enhanced by its connections with international
actors. The CCC concludes, 
‘[i]n all of its activities LICADHO seeks to have a direct effect on the victims of human rights
violations, to empower people to exercise their rights and protect themselves against abuses and
to reduce the climate of violence and impunity by influencing and educating key players and
policy makers.’(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 38)
LICADHO mobilizes communities for peaceful demonstrations not so much to build capacity but
rather to respond to human rights violations in Cambodia through its central office in Phnom Penh and
12 provincial offices. In its offices it has received hundreds of victims of human rights abuses,
including cases related to domestic violence, mob-killing, extra-judicial killing, illegal arrests and
detentions, rapes, physical assaults, etc..LICADHO exercises its ‘power to’ on behalf of these victims
by compiling confidential case files into a central electronic database, which is safeguarded and can be
used as evidence in court cases and for advocacy.
One wayofassessing the effectiveness of ‘power to’ is the impact on ‘visible power’. The CCC
attributes the following government responses to the combination of LICADHO’s evidence generation
and collective action efforts: (1) release of land rights activists, (2) release of human rights activists, (3)
the arrest of traffickers of women and children, (4) delays in forced evictions, (5) prosecution of
perpetrators (not all cases are brought to court, especially those related to politics) and (6) acceptance
of complaints from victims of human rights abuses(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 43).
‘Power with’
‘Powerwith’ refers to the synergy of collective action, social mobilisation and alliance building. All
four organizations participate in mutual supporting NGO networks at local, national and international
levels. Collective action often starts with human rights education and builds from there, generating
coalitions of local community members. One of the key strategies shared by all four organizations is
coalition building. By networking and collaborating on project and campaigns the organizations were
able to tap into collective power, which corresponds to ‘power with’, as discussed below.
Although CLEC employs skilled legally trained staff, its legal work is ‘guided by the community
needs’ and ‘all CLEC programmes are guided by the needs of the communities-
beneficiaries.’(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 15)Thus it incorporates participatory
processes into its administrative processes, such as the management team (consisting of the executive
director, programme manager, administrative and human resource manager, financial manager and four
unit heads), which ‘consult together and agree on participatory planning processes.’(Cambodia
Coordination Committee 2009b: 11) Further the CCC reports that ‘a participatory process to develop
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the strategic planning has been made with inclusion of communities, workers/unions and beneficiaries,
NGO-partners and other stakeholders to make sure CLEC interventions go [directly] to the needs of the
beneficiaries.’(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 12) CLEC engages in coalition building
withNGO partners and communities to ensure a more coordinated litigation strategy, and values
making connections with local communities and their counterparts in national and international context
in order to leverage support from these larger entities when necessary. CLEC seeks to consult with
government agencies to ensure that any proposed solutions are feasible and sustainable given
government constraints and budgets. 
ADHOC employs ‘power with’ strategies at the organizational level through the Cambodian
Human Rights Action Committee (CHRAC), a coalition currently of 21 NGO members, created in
1994.17 This umbrella organization promotes awareness through joint statements, media campaigns and
lobbying. The CCC enumerates the following three objectives for CHRAC:
‘(1) Encourage and coordinate active support for the victims of serious violations of basic
human right in their quest for justice and compensation,
‘(2) Annually publish accurate information on the number and nature of serious violations of
basic human rights in Cambodia (within information on who commits them and upon who they are
committed), and 
‘(3) Effectively advocate for changes to laws, official policies, and the practices of officials,
which will reduce violations of human rights.’(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 23)
Further, ADHOC’s Women’s Rights Programme has strong affiliations with similar programmes at
both governmental and non-governmental levels and is involved with the Committee for Free and Fair
Elections (COMFRELL), which monitors and investigates cases of political violence around electoral
procedures. 
ADHOC also participates in five international networks, ten national networks and has initiated
11provincial NGO networks(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 25). CDPO, for its part, has
joined seven other NGOs in the Disability and Human Rights Committee.
Unlike ADHOC and CLEC, LICADHO has become cautious in accepting membership of
coalitions of NGOs in recent years. For example, it was a member of CHRAC upon its inception but
withdrew its membership in 2002 due to what the CCC describes as LICADHO’s ‘workload and the
Committee’s management conflicts’(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 37). Nonetheless it
continues to cooperate with human rights NGOs and the Committee in a peripheral way and selectively
participate in some coalitions such as the Neutral and Impartial Committee for Free and Fair Elections
in Cambodia (NICFEC).The president of LICADHO is the head of a coalition of 36 member
organizations focused on the advancement of women’s rights in Cambodia called CAMBOW. CCC
reports that CAMBOW has no regular funding support, is not a strong coalition and several of its
members exist in name only.(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b:, 41).LICADHO is active in
NGO CEDAW, a coalition of 68 organizations, which works on shadow reports on the implementation
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. It is also a
17 See http://www.chrac.org/eng/
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member of Cambodia Peace Network, Forum Asia, the International Federation for Human Rights
(FIDH), NGO Forum and CCC. LICADHO has also been deeply engaged in coalitions involving
‘power with’. The strategy of coalition building has worked effectively to avoid duplication of effort
and especially to reinforce campaigns and other advocacy work, a striking example of ‘power with’.
An example is the reaction to the draft law on associations and NGOs released on 15 December
2010. Initially, a public consultation workshop on the draft was hosted by the Ministry of Interior on 10
January 2011 and more than 200 national and international NGO representatives attended. LICADHO,
for example, published a briefing paper concluding that the draft law must be assessed in the context of
limited freedom of association, expression and assembly, particularly at the community level. ‘Anyone
who is perceived to be challenging local or government officials is open to persecution, including arrest
and detention or threats and violence’ (LICADHO 2010: 8; Human Rights Watch 2011).A second draft
law was released on 24 March 2011, and nearly 600 NGOs signed a joint statement declaring the
second draft unacceptable (International Center for Non-Profit Law 2011). More than 60 international
NGOs submitted a letter to the Minister of Interior requesting that the government withdraw the draft
law ‘until it is substantially re-written’ to address civil society concerns (Miller &Titthara 2011). A
Working Group on Enabling and Protecting Civil Society was created to inform the international
community of such regulatory threats to the effective functioning of civil society and there is even a
Facebook page ‘Oppose the Cambodian NGO & Associations Law’. The UN Special Rapporteur on
Cambodia encouraged such collaboration and supported such initiatives’ (United Nations 2011). The
latest reports indicate thatPrime Minister Hun Sen announced at the end of 2011 that the draft law need
not be passed in a rush and even that NGO consultations could continue until 2014. (Sopheak2011), 
CDPO also engages in networks to establish ‘power with’, but works with both non-governmental
and governmental agencies, such as CHRAC, the National Strategic Development Plan’s Inclusive
Committee (government entity), the Land Mine Survivor Committee, Wheelchair Committee,
Advocacy Team Committee, Children with Disability Committee, NGO-CEDAW, Disability
Awareness Group and the NGO forum on Cambodia and government ministries. Beyond the
organizational level, CDPO also encourages the enhancement of ‘power with’ amongst its constituents.
It has strong networks of persons with disabilities range from the village to the national level. CDPO’s
ability to engage with grassroots organizations as well as national government officials on an equal
footing is characterized by CCC as ‘unique’ amongst non-governmental agencies. As the only one of
the four organizations that has a single constituency, CDPO engages its members and stakeholders in
discussion on the organization’s priorities and planning(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 33-
34). CDPO has a highly structured way of reaching out to communities. It forms self-help groups run
by persons with disabilities at the community and village levels. These groups in turn form federations
of persons with disabilities (PWDs) at the district level. At a third level, four or five district federations
form one Disabled People’s Organization (DPO), which meets in the General Assembly at the National
level to guide CDPO in its work with all relevant ministries, thus representing the voice of all
Cambodian disabled people(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 32).
‘Power within’
‘Powerwithin’ as a form of power illustrates a sense of self-dignity and self-awareness that enables
agency. By placing local actors in decision-making and leadership positions, most of the NGOs were
able to generate a sense of agency within individuals. The ‘power within’ was critical to some NGOs
while others did not see it as essential to human rights promotion. ‘Power within’ seems to be
instrumental to sustainable human rights promotion insofar as individuals can see themselves in a new
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light, informed by the potential that human rights provide. However, building this sense of ‘power
within’ did not seem to come easy. Various NGOs employed diverse efforts to generate a reflection
process whereby local actors could take ownership of the campaigns, and issues that affected them
most.  
‘Power within’is a particularly effective form of power for ADHOC, reflected in its People
Empowerment Programme (PEP), the purpose of which is ‘strengthening the capacity of ordinary
citizens [and] enabling them to defend their own rights’ in the 91 communities in 15 Cambodian
provinces where it operates(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 19). The means towards this
end include sensitization sessions to raise awareness of community members; training courses to
provide knowledge on human rights, women rights, and related matters; regular meetings to review
work and anticipate next steps; exposure visits to share experiences betweencommunities; as well as
provincial seminars and civic education workshops.
A further example of ‘power within’ promoted by ADHOC is its educational activity in the
Women’s Rights Programme, which takes place in seven provinces throughout Cambodia. Through
knowledge-building processes, ADHOC seeks to support women in becoming aware of their human
rights, recognizing when they are being violated and seeking redress when necessary(Cambodia
Coordination Committee 2009b: 20). 
Aside from individual capacity building, ADHOC also engages with local organizations in their
growth towards ‘power within’. It supports community agencies in organizational aspects of
mobilization by reviewing day-to-day activities, sharing new information and strategies and supporting
planning efforts. ADHOC also offers exposure visits, which allow for sharing to occur between
communities of successful and transferable strategies that have already been employed. Like CLEC,
ADHOC focuses on land dispute resolution using ‘power within’ approaches where community
members and government officials are trained on relevant laws and procedures and legal advice is
made available to evictees. 
One of the strengths of CDPO is itsability to enhance the growth of ‘power within’ amongst its
constituents. The CCC report states that CDPO has ‘developed networks of people with disabilities to
support, promote and protect their rights, achievements and interest in order to bring about their
[fullest] participation and [establish] equality in society... [but] CDPO’s role is not to provide services
or material benefits to disabled people.’(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 29) This approach
prioritizes capacity building over resource building and has proven successful for the organization
mainly because so many other organizations assistpersons with disability based on charity and resource
building, whereas CDPO is able to provide a niche assistance, which focuses on ‘power within’ and the
integration of disability and development efforts(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 29). A
noteworthy example is the formation of disability self-help groups and district federations, which form
one Disabled People’s Organization (DPO) to represent disabled people at the provincial level and
CDPO is formed by a General Assembly of these DPOs at the national level. Persons with disability are
given a voice and representation, which builds their confidence and ability to exert their rights. The
CCC report states that ‘men and women with and without disability.... working for CDPO are
appreciated [by] government officials at provincial and national levels’(Cambodia Coordination
Committee 2009b: 33). 
LICADO exercises ‘power within’ by encouraging powerless people to develop self-awareness in
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several ways. First, its trainings and educational workshops prepare its clients to advocate for
themselves. The CCC report states that LICADHO has
 ‘conducted thousands of three-day training courses and a half-day dissemination sessions [for]
the general population, Buddhist monks, high school students, police officials, commune council
members, military personnel and gendarmes within 12 provinces and Phnom Penh. These
workshops aim to promote human rights by disseminating information about human rights and
law and how to redress human rights violations.’(Cambodia Coordination Committee 2009b: 37)
Thus, these efforts seek to empower people to claim their own rights. Although the Human Rights
Education Office was abandoned in 2007 after a revision of the strategic plan, these activities continue
without being centralized in this office. However, the CCC warns that ‘LICADHO does not have
expertise in community development’ since its strengths are in monitoring and advocacy(Cambodia
Coordination Committee 2009b: 41). LICADHO focuses more on legal aspects of support than the
social welfare of its constituents and has used its advocacy work to create countervailing power
through encouraging people to act on a newly acquired awareness of their rights and their allies, thus
contributing to both their ‘power within’ and ‘power with’. 
Conclusion: Human Rights and Transformation of Power Structures
In answering the research question ‘To what extent have rights-promoting organizations been
successful in transforming power structures and securing rights?’ we need to keep in mind the context
of Cambodia’s fragile transition from decades of civil war, foreign intervention, and social and
economic destruction. Cambodia’s ancient heritage, in which patronage and clientship at the village
level combined with reverence for the king and absolute obedience to high-level officials, have vestiges
in popular attitudes. The more significant constraints on the activities of civil society for the promotion
and protection of human rights, however, derive from the elite’s manipulation of the political system
following the departure of the UNTAC in 1993. Since then, as discussed above in the section on
‘historical and political background’, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and Prime Minister Hun
Sen have managed to dominate the institutions of government and partially stifle political opposition
and intimidate critical expression from journalists and NGOs. Much of the strength of CPP comes from
its ability to control village committees and provide a degree of development and prosperity acceptable
to most of the rural poor, unless their traditional ways are upset by land grabs and resource depletion.
Large segments of the rural population are not directly affected by the undemocratic and repressive
practices of the ruling party. Moreover, the urban population benefits from increased employment
opportunities that have come with Cambodia’s high economic growth rate. Therefore, even the most
successful human rights mobilization is not likely to alter fundamentally the political base of CPP’s
power. Nevertheless, this trend to concentrate political power in the dominant party has been checked
to a degree by three countervailing forces using the types of power and operating in the spaces
described above.
The first check on excessive power comes from the international community in the form of bilateral
aid and pressure from government delegations, multilateral technical and aid institutions of the United
Nations and the European Communities, and the extensive presence of and funding from foreign
NGOs. This pressure is further exerted through political supervision of the government by UN bodies,
especially the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia (now
Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council), a position which has been occupied by some of the
most reputed names in human rights advocacy, whose voices are taken very seriously and whose
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courage and integrity greatly enhance the UN special procedures. Not surprisingly, the Cambodian
government has denounced these mandate-holders.Referring to the four successive special
representatives on human rights in Cambodia, the former head of the OHCHR office in Cambodia has
written, “Hun Sen … swung between reluctant cooperation with the representatives and vindictive
personal attacks on them.” (Picken 2011)However, the OHCHR recently ‘welcomed the exemplary
cooperation of the Government with United Nations human rights mechanisms’.(United Nations
2010b, para. 3)Treaty bodies and other special procedures have scrutinized Cambodia’s shortcomings
in respecting human rights and the rights of political opposition and civil society. The Cambodia Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has supported these mandates, along with its extensive
human rights training and support for local NGOs. It too has come under attack by the government,
which regularly threatens the closing of that office but has not done so, which is a sign of the
limitations of its repressive power. The potential for altering power relations in this global space of
power is reduced by the trend of international donors to align with national development policiesand of
the Cambodian government to make clear to bilateral donors that China is a willing partner without
human rights conditionality. A study by Oxfam America noted that since the US lifted restrictions on
bilateral assistance to Cambodia in 2007 and developed closer relations with the government, ‘civil
society groups have begun to fear that the supposed shift may dampen their work’. Although the US
does not aid the government directly ‘some worry that the US is trying to align its funding with
government priorities that may not reflect the concerns of the citizens’. (Oxfam America 2009: 4) 
The second countervailing force is the political opposition, which, in spite of violence and
manipulation by the CPP in various elections, won 29 seats in 2008, although the CPP won 90 of the
123 seats (with smaller parties dividing the rest). Significantly, the opposition is represented by the
Democratic Movement for Change, an alliance of the Sam Rainsy Party (26 seats) and the Human
Rights Party (3 seats), itself a product of a human rights NGO.  They are seeking to gain enough
popular support to change significantly the relative political power of the parties in the 2013 elections.
Nonetheless, despite the significant gains in representation in the National Assembly, and despite the
strong identification of the opposition with human rights, the political base of the CPP remains strong
at the village level. With increased urbanization, the success of the opposition might find a greater
degree of popular support to challenge CPP domination. 
The third countervailing force is found in civil society, representing, to a large extent, the altered
expectations of how power should be shared in a democratic society and whose actions based on those
expectations have achieved a limited degree of success in challenging and transforming power
structures. Again the altered expectations are shared more by urban populations that by the rural poor,
where CPP’s delivery of development outcomes and lower levels of education lessen the threat of civil
society to the power structure hostile to human rights. Nevertheless, action in rural areas by the NGOs
examined here around issues of land and environmental sustainability is challenging popular support
for CPP in these areas. The principal features of successful strategies of challenging and transforming
power structures among these four civil society organizations are (1) forging links with local and
affected communities, (2) deliberate use of human rights language as a tool of empowerment, (3)
effective coalition-building, and (4) challenging the government in spaces where the costs of
disregarding human rights may, in the long term, outweigh the benefits of manipulating institutions,
such as the judiciary. 
In conclusion, our findings indicate that although civil society organizations enlist numerous,
diverse and far-reaching strategies to promote human rights in Cambodia, they are limited by the
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political landscape of present and recent history. Specifically, the transformation of power structures at
both the local and national levels is largely constrained by the CPP and its control over the institutions
of the state, despite the nominal separation of powers in the constitution. International donors and
financial institutions, both bilateral and multilateral, support independent civil society organizations,
including those working to promote human rights, while simultaneously undermining their efforts to be
a countervailing force by aligning their aid and lending policies with Cambodian government agendas.
This reality seems contradictory since international donors and institutions haveboth human rights
policies, through which they support Cambodian civil society, and geostrategic interests, which push
them to work with the Royal Government of Cambodia. Based on our findings, the most successful
local strategies employed by NGOs are rooted in local participation at both the community and
administrative levels, where local actors are instrumental in problem solving, advocacy and technical
support. The community participation dimension strengthens civil society’s ability to affect power
relations as it reduces the central government’s ‘hidden power’ (or decision-making without
transparency), although not always its ‘visible power’ over NGOs. This dimension also opens up closed
spaces relating to women’s and land rights, as well as environmental sustainability, domains where
international donors are less likely to support the government. 
In sum, Cambodia has many elements of autocracy coexisting with its fragile democratic
foundations. It is uncertain whether civil society will continue to open spaces challenging power in
light of the range of repressive tools available, high rates of economic growth, and global economic
interests, all of which reinforce the powers of the autocratic state. Arrayed against these elements of
power are the democratic constitution, courageous and experienced NGO and opposition leaders,
grassroots advocacy movements, and transnational support networks. The impact of the study
organizations has been noticeable in engaging certain government offices on issues previously
neglected, such as indigenous rights, and in improving the lives of groups they have supported, such as
the disabled or prisoners. However, they have not resulted in significant changes in the governance
structures or political power of the dominant party. Building on a fragile democratic foundation in
1993, civic action, with the support of international partners, has made it more difficult for the ‘visible
power’ of government to avoid accountability and transparency. While the study organizations and
other components of civil society have not radically transformed power relations, Cambodia’s
democratic future depends to a large extent on their continued ability to utilize the power of human
rights discourse, and the resonance it has among affected communities and international support
groups, in order to limit further the autocratic tendencies of the structures of power in Cambodia.
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